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We investigate whether corporate governance is related to insolvency risk of financial 
institutions. Using a large sample of U.S. financial institutions over the 2005–2010 period, 
we find that corporate governance is positively related with insolvency risk of financial 
institutions as proxied by Merton’s distance to default measure and credit default swap 
spread. We also find that “better” corporate governance increased insolvency risk relatively 
more for larger financial institutions and during the period of the global financial crisis. Our 
findings suggest that too-big-to fail and deposit insurance policies encourage excessive risk 
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“Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporates 
assure themselves of getting return on their investment.”  
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737) 
Agency theory advocates corporate managers may pursue their own interests rather than 
maximizing shareholders’ value and thus create a conflict of interest. This agency behavior stems 
from the view that corporate managers may be more risk averse than shareholders because they 
want to protect their undiversified human capital and investment in the firm. Shareholder-friendly 
corporate governance mechanisms can influence the behavior of managers and change their 
willingness to take on more risk. In this regard, John, Litov, and Young (2008) show that 
shareholder-friendliness of corporate governance mechanisms encourages risk-taking and 
promotes the growth of non-financial firms. More recently, in the wake of the financial crisis, 
several studies have shed light on the role of corporate governance towards risk-taking and 
financial performance of financial institutions (Adams, 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Peni 
and Vahamaa, 2012). Specifically, several studies focus on risk taking by financial institutions 
especially during the recent global financial crisis (Pathan, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Berger, Kick, and Schaeck, 2014; Iqbal, Strobl and Vahamaa, 2015). Overall, these studies 
suggest excessive risk taking by financial institutions during the financial crisis. Thus, stronger 
corporate governance practices encourage rather than constrain excessive risk-taking in the 
financial industry (Iqbal et al., 2015) which may lead to the default of financial institution. 
Therefore, in this paper, we investigate whether corporate governance affects the insolvency risk 




‘Stronger’1 corporate governance not only affects the performance of the firms (Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Ammann et 
al., 2011) but also encourages increased risk-taking that results in higher growth of firms (John, 
Litov, and Yeung, 2008). However, for financial institutions, the optimal degree of risk taking is 
different than for non-financial firms because financial institutions have deposit insurance subsidy 
(e.g., Merton, 1978) which benefits them if they become distressed. This financial safety 
encourages financial institutions to take excessive risks and since larger financial institutions are 
considered “too-big-to-fail” by regulators, they can benefit relatively more from deposit insurance 
at a substantial cost to stakeholders (see Acharya, Anginer and Warburton, 2016). This “too-big-
to-fail” phenomenon creates moral hazard problems and shareholder-friendly governance 
mechanisms may further encourage managers to adopt riskier corporate policies (Chava and 
Purnanadam, 2010) which may, in turn, lead to higher insolvency risk in financial institutions. 
Although managers are more risk averse than shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) the 
presence of deposit insurance in financial institutions, especially in banks, may affect the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and risk-taking in financial institutions 
(Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, Huizinga, and Ma, 2014) and stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms in financial institutions can lead to greater risk-taking.  Therefore, we hypothesize 
that strong corporate governance mechanisms are positively associated with insolvency risk of 
financial institutions.   
                                                 
1 Corporate governance mechanisms and the board of directors are considered to be stronger and more shareholder-
friendly when they provide effective monitoring and stronger protection of shareholder’s interests, and more 
generally, better alignment of managers’ interests with those of the shareholders. Adams (2012) and de Haan and 
Vlahu (2015) provide comprehensive discussions about the corporate governance of financial institutions and the 
elements of “good” governance. 
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To test the hypothesis, we utilize the comprehensive data on the U.S. financial institutions 
from 2005 to 2010, thus including the period of recent financial crisis which previous studies 
excluded. We use Corporate Governance Quotient and Sub-Quotients (namely Board Quotient, 
Compensation Quotient, Audit Quotient and Takeover Quotient) issued by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) to measure the strength of corporate governance mechanisms. To 
capture insolvency risk, we use traditional (i.e., distance to default) and innovative market based 
(i.e., credit default swap (CDS) spread) measures. Recent studies (e.g., Bolton, Mehran, and 
Shapiro, 2015) utilize CDS spread to proxy insolvency risk and advertise that it is preferable 
because it also accounts for creditors risk (Colonello, 2016; Feldhutter, Hotchkiss, and Karakas, 
2016). Despite growing literature on the relationship between CDS spread and corporate finance 
issues, surprisingly little is known about the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and CDS spread. We extend this growing literature by empirically examining 
whether the strength of corporate governance mechanisms affects CDS spread for financial 
institutions.  
In summary, we find that the insolvency risk of financial institutions, proxied by its 
market-based distance to default or CDS spread, is positively associated with the shareholder-
friendliness of its corporate governance. Further, this positive association between corporate 
governance and insolvency risk is significantly stronger for larger financial institutions and during 
the financial crisis. Our findings are broadly consistent with the prior literature on risk-taking by 
financial institutions (see e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin, Goldberg and Roth, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 
2012). These findings suggest that stronger corporate governance mechanisms may encourage 
excessive risk-taking in the financial industry and the deposit insurance subsidy could also be a 
contributing factor to excessive risk-taking. Since financial institutions are entering into more 
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complex activities and have broadened their scope, this effect has been amplified in recent years, 
making it difficult for regulators to keep pace with the changes. Our results are economically 
significant and robust to several additional analyses, including propensity score matching to 
mitigate the concerns regarding endogeneity.    
Our study is not the first to establish a link between corporate governance and insolvency 
risk of financial institutions. For instance, Anginer et al. (2014) find that share-holder-friendly 
corporate governance mechanisms are associated with greater insolvency risk (i.e., lower Z-score 
and distance to default) for a sample of international banks. However, our study differs from their 
study in multiple aspects. First, they do not test the impact of global financial crisis on 
governance–insolvency nexus. Second, their sample only includes large banks and does not 
consider other types of financial institutions. Third, their measure of insolvency risk does not 
include credit default swap spread. Some other studies also examine the governance-default 
linkage but provide contrasting evidence. Using a sample of Canadian financial institutions over 
the period of 2010 to 2013 (post crisis), Switzer, Wang and Zhang (2016) find that large and more 
independent boards have higher default risk as measured through distance to default, while in 
contrast, Switzer and Wang (2013) provide evidence that U.S. commercial banks with larger and 
more independent boards have lower levels of default risk during the period from 2001 to 2007, 
that is, prior to the global financial crisis. With these mixed results, the issue of whether the 
strength of corporate governance mechanisms affects the insolvency risk for financial institutions 
is still an empirical matter. It is therefore timely and imperative to empirically examine the 
association between the shareholder-friendliness of corporate governance mechanisms and 
6 
 
insolvency risk for a large sample of U.S. financial institutions around the period of the recent 
global financial crisis. 
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the growing 
body of literature in corporate finance that relates firm-level characteristics to the failure of 
financial institutions. Previous contributions to this literature mostly emphasize investigating the 
influence of accounting variables on financial institutions’ failure probabilities. Some of the 
earliest works in this literature stream are Meyer and Pfifer (1970), Martin (1977), and Whalen 
and Thomson (1988). These studies mainly find that low capitalization results in poor bank 
performance and increased failure probability. Furthermore, a few studies investigate the factors 
that drive bank failures during the global financial crisis (see Aubuchon and Wheelock, 2010; 
Cole and White, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014). Aubuchon 
and Wheelock (2010) show that economic downturns play an important role in bank failures 
during the crisis period. Cole and White (2012) investigate how accounting-based variables 
contributed to the bank failures in 2009. Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that bank equity capital 
is important for the survival of banks (especially smaller banks) during periods of crisis. Ng and 
Roychowdhury (2014) find that during the period of the recent financial crisis loan loss reserves 
added back as regulatory capital were positively associated with bank failures. However, studies 
on the role of corporate governance in the failure of financial institutions are relatively scarce. For 
instance, Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2016) investigate the role of bank ownership and 
compensation structures in bank failures during the recent global financial crisis. We contribute 
by showing that strength of corporate governance mechanisms plays an important role in 
insolvency risk of financial institutions.  
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Second, we contribute to the literature on the effects of corporate governance on risk 
taking by financial institutions (see Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Peni and Vahamaa, 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Iqbal et al., 
2015)2. These studies mainly find that shareholder-friendly corporate governance mechanisms 
encourage excessive risk-taking in the financial industry. For instance, Pathan (2009) finds that 
board size can affect the risk-taking in banks and show that banks with larger boards take less 
risk. Further, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that better alignment of bank CEO incentives 
with the interests of shareholders can negatively affect the bank’s performance. Iqbal et al. (2015) 
find that financial institutions with more shareholder-friendly governance mechanisms are 
associated with higher level of systemic risk. Building on these studies, we relate corporate 
governance to insolvency risk for a large sample of U.S financial institutions. We particularly 
focus on the association between corporate governance and insolvency risk amidst the recent 
financial crisis. As far as we know, this is one of the few studies to show the relevance of corporate 
governance to a financial institution’s insolvency risk especially in the context of the recent global 
financial crisis. We show that strong governance mechanisms significantly affect the insolvency 
risk of financial institutions that can cause instability in the overall financial system. Then, we 
show that financial institutions with strong boards have a greater insolvency risk. We believe that 
connecting board strength to insolvency risk is relevant because the existing literature does not 
provide a satisfactory answer regarding the role of boards in controlling the agency relationship3. 
Further, most of the previous studies on board effectiveness do not include financial institutions 
                                                 
2 Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro (2011) survey studies investigating the relationship between corporate governance 
and measures of risk. 
3 Adams et al. (2010) survey literature on the role of the board of directors. de Haan and Vlahu (2015) also provide 
detailed discussion on corporate governance and risk taking in the financial industry. 
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in their sample (see Adams et al., 2010). We also confirm the previous literature (Adams and 
Mehran, 2012) that in the financial industry, restrictions on board size can be counter-productive. 
Lastly, building on the earlier contributions, we utilize the market-based CDS spread data to proxy 
insolvency risk, which also accounts for credit risk.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
explains the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the methods, and reports 
our empirical findings on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
insolvency risk of financial institutions. Finally, the last section concludes with policy 
implications. 
 
2. Data and variables 
 
In this study, we investigate the relationship of corporate governance mechanisms and 
insolvency risk for a sample of 556 publicly traded U.S. financial institutions over the 2005–2010 
period. To empirically examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
insolvency risk, we collect data on corporate governance mechanisms from the Corporate 
Governance Quotient database developed by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Insolvency 
risk data is collected from the Credit Research Initiative (CRI) database managed by the Risk 
Management Institute (RMI) at the National University of Singapore4. Lastly, data on financial 
statement and balance sheet variables is collected from BankScope of Bureau Van Dijk.  
                                                 
4 RMI-CRI database covers over 60,000 listed firms in Asia Pacific, North America, Europe, Latin America, the 
Middle East and Africa. The RMI-CRI database provides historical time series of individual distance to default on a 
monthly frequency at the firm level. Thus, monthly frequency of individual distance to default requires an adjustment 
to annual frequency to be consistent with other variables. 
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Starting from the entire population of U.S. financial institutions (commercial banks, 
investment banks, non-bank lending institutions, and financial services firms) in Corporate 
Governance Quotient database, we first identify the financial institutions for which the insolvency 
risk data (distance to default and credit default swap spread) is available from the RMI-CRI 
database. Doing so, we are left with 650 financial institutions. We then eliminate the financial 
institutions from our sample that have insufficient data on financial statement and balance sheet 
variables taken from BankScope. This leaves us with a final sample of 556 individual financial 
institutions and an unbalanced panel of 2126 firm-year observations. 
 
3.1. Insolvency risk measures 
 
The dependent variable in our study is the insolvency risk (Insolvency Risk). Since the 
seminal work of Beaver (1966), a number of accounting and market-based insolvency prediction 
models have been developed in the literature. The validity of accounting-based models has been 
questioned due to the backward-looking nature of the financial statement through which these 
models are derived (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008). On the other hand, market-based models using 
the option pricing approach developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) provide 
an appealing alternative to the prediction of insolvency conditions of listed firms and have been 
used in extant empirical studies (e.g., Hillegeist et al., 2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; 
Charitou et al., 2013). Such a methodological approach overcomes the criticisms of accounting-
based models through the forward-looking nature of market data. Market data reflect expectations 
of a firm’s future cash flows, and hence should be more appropriate for prediction purposes. 
Another prevalent feature of such models is their provision of a “finer” volatility assessment that 
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aids in predicting the risk of insolvency (Beaver et al., 2005).5 Empirical studies such as Hillegeist 
et al. (2004) recommend researchers to use market-based models of default prediction since these 
models contain more information about default than accounting-based models. We therefore use 
the market-based Merton (1974) distance to default (DD) and credit default swap (CDS) spread 
in gauging insolvency risk (see appendix A: general procedure to calculate DD). CDS are credit 
derivatives that allow the transfer of the firm’s default risk between two agents for a 
predetermined time period. In a typical CDS contract, the protection seller offers the protection 
buyer insurance against the default of an underlying bond issued by a certain company (the 
reference entity). In the event of default by the reference entity, the seller commits to buy the bond 
for a price equal to its face value from the protection buyer.6 In exchange for the insurance, the 
buyer pays a quarterly premium, called the CDS spread, quoted as an annualized percentage of 
the notional value insured. Therefore, by definition, the CDS spread is the pricing of the 
insolvency risk (Das et al., 2009). The higher the insolvency risk of the reference entity, the higher 
is the CDS spread. Tang and Yan (2010) find that the CDS spread captures the major portion of 
the firm level determinants of insolvency risk. Thus, the CDS spread should serve as a valid and 
robust measure of a firm’s insolvency conditions.  
In this paper, we extract the CDS spread data from the “Credit Research Initiative (CRI)” 
platform of the National University of Singapore (NUS). However, they refer it to as “actuarial 
spread”7. Actuarial spread is constructed on the design of traditional CDS but without upfront fee. 
Further, construction of actuarial spread is based on the assumption that market participants are 
                                                 
5 Volatility is a critical factor in predicting default risk since it captures the probability that the value of a firm’s assets will decrease to such a point 
that the firm will be unable to repay its debt obligations. Ceteris paribus, the higher the volatility, the higher is the default risk. Depending on asset 
volatilities, two firms with identical leverage ratios can have substantially different chances of financial distress. Therefore, measures of volatility 
should be incorporated in financial distress models. 
6 In practice, the terms of the CDS could involve physical delivery of the defaulted bond or cash settlement. 
7 This paper uses CDS spread terminology for ease of understanding.   
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risk-neutral that is why no upfront fee is initially required. Therefore, actuarial spread has the 
same features as the standard CDS spread. 
 
3.2. Corporate governance measures 
 
In this paper, we utilize the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) index which measures 
the strength of corporate governance mechanisms and is issued by Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS)8. We obtain these data from RiskMetrics Group. CGQ is comprehensive corporate 
governance index which comprises of 67 different firm-related characteristics including internal 
and external governance. For instance, different mechanisms included in CGQ include board of 
directors, ownership structure, directors’ education, audit committees, executive compensation 
structure, charter/bylaws, and form of incorporation. This data is obtained from surveys conducted 
by the ISS, company websites, and public filings. The values of CGQ may range from 0 to 100, 
with higher values of the quotient corresponding to stronger, more shareholder-focused corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
In addition to the aggregate governance measure CGQ, we also use four sub-indices, called 
board, compensation and ownership, auditing and takeover that summarize information different 
attributes related to the various aspects of corporate governance. The takeover sub-index, for 
instance, has a higher score, if there are fewer corporate governance-related barriers to takeovers. 
These sub-indices may take values from 1 to 5, with higher values of the index representing 
stronger, more shareholder-friendly mechanisms.  
                                                 
8 The ISS Corporate Governance Quotient been previously used as a proxy for the strength of corporate governance, 




3.3. Control variables 
 
Following prior literature on bank risk-taking (e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; 
Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Mayordomo et al., 2014; Iqbal et al., 2015), we 
control for several institution-specific variables that may influence the insolvency risk of the 
financial institutions. We control for firm size, profitability, growth, and assets as well as income 
structure. When comparing financial institutions, size is the most important control variable. The 
size (Size) variable is constructed as the log of a financial institution’s total assets. This approach 
is also consistent with the previous studies. Larger financial institutions may pursue riskier 
strategies, if they are considered to be “too-big-to-fail”. Moreover, Brunnermeier et al. (2012) 
show that larger financial institutions are also systemically important. Secondly, in previous 
literature, capital ratio (or leverage ratio) is used when comparing financial institutions. However, 
in this study we do not include capital ratio as both our measures for insolvency risk (DD and 
CDS) have equity as a main constituent in their calculation.   
In addition to Size, we account for the institution’s financial performance, growth, and 
asset and income structure. We measure financial performance with Return on assets which is 
calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets. Growth is measured as the percentage change 
in the amount of outstanding loans. We control for the institution’s business model and asset 
structure with the ratio of net loans to total assets (Loans to assets) and the ratio of deposits to 
total assets (Deposits to assets). Finally, we use the ratio of non-interest income to total income 
(Non-interest income) to control for the level of income diversification and non-traditional 
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banking activities. The data on our control variables are obtained from Bureau van Dijk 
Bankscope. The definitions of variables are summarized in Table A. 
 
(insert Table A about here) 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Descriptive statistics show that our sample of financial institutions is quite heterogeneous in terms 
of corporate governance strength as CGQ varies from 0.5 (minimum) to 100 (maximum) and has 
an average of 50.2. Further, the corporate governance sub-indices, board, compensation, audit, 
and takeover, also vary from lowest (0) to the highest (5) suggesting that our sample of financial 
institutions is diverse in terms of very weak and very strong corporate governance mechanisms. 
In addition to this, our sample is also quite heterogeneous in terms of insolvency risk. It can be 
noted from Table 1 that DD has a minimum value of -2.2 and a maximum value of 20.7. Moreover, 
CDS varies from a minimum of -2.4 to a maximum of 7.9 with a mean value of 3.6. 
 Table 1 further depicts that our sample is also quite heterogeneous in terms of control 
variables. The sample contains small and large U.S. financial institutions. There is considerable 
variation in size ranging from 12.7 million to 2.26 trillion USD. In brief, our sample of U.S. 
financial institutions is very heterogeneous.   
 




Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations among the variables used in the analysis. It can 
be noted from the table that CGQ and governance sub-indices have a negative (positive) 
correlation with DD (CDS),9 suggesting better governed financial institutions have a greater level 
of insolvency risk. Moreover, as expected, the two insolvency risk variables, DD and CDS, are 
inversely correlated by construction (r=0.93). As the correlation results do not control the factors 
that affect financial distress, they should be viewed with caution.10 The correlations also indicate 
that larger financial institutions have less insolvency risk.  
 
(insert Table 2 about here) 
 
 
4.2. Univariate tests 
 
We start by investigating the association between corporate governance and insolvency of 
financial institutions in a univariate setting. We do so by dividing our sample of financial 
institutions into two groups formed on the basis of strength of corporate governance. The first 
group comprises financial institutions with stronger corporate governance structures, that is, 
financial institutions with CGQ values in the top 30 percent. The second group includes financial 
institutions with weaker corporate governance structures, that is, those with CGQ values in bottom 
                                                 
9 There is a significant negative correlation of CG variables with the components of DD i.e. asset volatility and equity volatility, suggesting that 
better governed firms are more volatile. 
10 We also observe a significant difference at the 1% level in the insolvency risk measures between the high CGQ firms and the low CGQ firms 
(results available on request). 
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30 percent. After creating two groups based on the strength of corporate governance mechanisms, 
we check for the difference in means by performing two-tailed t-tests.   
 
 (insert Table 3 about here) 
 
We report the results of the univariate analysis in Table 2. We find that the two groups are 
significantly different in many respects. First, the difference of means between the two groups for 
distance to default is negative and statistically significant, and for CDS spread is positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, the univariate analysis provides evidence that financial institutions 
with stronger corporate governance mechanisms are associated with a higher level of insolvency 
risk.  
 
4.3. Regression results 
 
We use panel data where insolvency risk is the dependent variable for the estimation of 
our model. Our baseline model to examine the association between corporate governance and 
insolvency risk follows several alternative panel regressions of the equation below: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  











where the dependent variable Insolvency Riski,t is one of the two alternative measures of 
insolvency risk: distance to default and CDS spread for financial institution i at time t. First, 
distance to default measures the difference between the asset value of the financial institution and 
the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the financial institution’s asset value 
(see Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi, 2008, p. 2899). Second, the CDS spread is the pricing of 
the financial distress risk (Das et al., 2009). CDS are credit derivatives that allow the transfer of 
the firm’s default risk between two agents for a predetermined time period. Governancej,t is either 
the CGQ which measures the strength of the institution’s corporate governance mechanisms or 
one of the sub-indices namely; board index, compensation and ownership index, auditing index, 
and takeover index which summarizes information regarding different corporate governance 
mechanisms. In order to capture the effect of global financial crisis we also estimate the modified 
versions of Equation (1) where we include the interaction variable Governance  GFC. Where 
GFC denotes the crisis year 2008. Further, we also use the interaction variable Governance  Size 
in order to investigate the effect of the size of the financial institution.  
As discussed earlier, we use several firm-level control variables in order to control for the 
effects of observable characteristics of financial institutions that may impact the insolvency risk. 
Control variables used in this study are consistent with the previous literature on the determinants 
of risk-taking in financial institutions (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Bai 
and Elyasiani, 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). These control variables are defined as follows: 
Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals 
assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t–1 to year t, Deposits to assets 
is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income 
to total income. Finally, the regressions also include firm and year fixed effects, and errors are 
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clustered at the firm level. We also winsorize all the independent variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to mitigate potential outlier effects. 
Table 4 reports the estimates of ten alternative versions of Equation (1) with the distance 
to default (DD) as the dependent variable. Models 1 and 6 include only Size and Return on assets 
as the control variables for the purpose of parsimony. Whereas, Models 2 and 7 include the full 
set of control variables and year fixed-effect, and Models 3 and 8 include both year and firm fixed-
effects along with full set of control variables. Further, Model 4 and 9 include interaction variables 
CGQ  GFC and BoardQ  GFC respectively for the global financial crisis. Lastly, in Models 5 
and 10 we include size interaction variables CGQ  Size and BoardQ  Size respectively. The 
adjusted R2s of all the models are almost 50 percent. The F-statistics for all the ten alternative 
regressions are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
(insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Table 4 illustrates that the overall corporate governance index has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient in Models 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7, suggesting that more shareholder-
friendly corporate governance increases insolvency risk of financial institutions. Moreover, in 
Models 4 and 9, the negative effect is stronger during the period of the financial crisis and in 
Models 5 and 10, the negative effect is also stronger for larger financial institutions. This shows 
greater insolvency risk during financial crisis period and also suggests that larger financial 
institutions take on more risk as they benefit from a “too-big-to-fail” status. In summary, Table 4 
indicates that financial institutions with stronger, more shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
mechanisms and boards of directors are associated with greater insolvency risk. Overall the 
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findings reported in Table 4 are broadly consistent with the literature on risk-taking by financial 
institutions (see e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; de Haan and Vlahu, 2015; Iqbal et al., 
2015). Our results are also economically significant. For instance, the change in CGQ from 25th 
percentile to 75th percentile is associated with up to a 7.28 percent increase in the insolvency risk 
of financial institutions (see Table 6) and during the global financial crisis, the increase in 
insolvency risk rises to 7.81 percent. We measure the economic significance by calculating the 
marginal effect of an increase of CGQ from the 25th to the 75th percentile and then multiply the 
difference by the coefficient. We then divide this variation by the average insolvency risk.   
 
(insert Table 5 about here) 
 
Table 5 presents the regression estimates of Equation (1) with credit default swap spread 
(CDS) as the dependent variable. Regressions in this table are similar to those in Table 4 with 
estimates of ten alternative versions of Equations (1). Here, the adjusted R2s of these regressions 
vary from 45.1 percent to 51.7 percent. The F-statistics are significant at the 1 percent level, which 
indicates a good fit of the estimated models. Again, the Governance variable in Models 1–5 is 
CGQ and in Models 6–10 is BoardQ. Overall, the regression estimates with CDS as dependent 
variable are similar to the DD results reported in Table 4. All the coefficient estimates in Table 5 
are positively associated with CDS spread indicating that stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms are associated with greater insolvency risk. This effect is even stronger during the 
period of financial crisis and for larger financial institutions. These findings provide further 
evidence that insolvency risk of financial institutions is positively associated with shareholder-
friendly corporate governance mechanisms. Bigger financial institutions may be riskier, because 
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they expect a bailout by regulators in case of insolvency since they benefit from “too-big-to-fail” 
status. Again, our results are also economically significant. For instance, a change in CGQ from 
the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile is associated with an up to 3.05 percent increase in 
insolvency risk of financial institutions as measured by CDS spread (see Table 6) and during the 
global financial crisis the increase in insolvency risk as measured by CDS spread is up to 3.39 
percent. 
 
(insert Table 6 about here) 
(insert Table 7 about here) 
 
Table 7 reports the estimates of six alternative versions of Equation (1) with the distance 
to default (DD) as the dependent variable. However, here Governancej,t represents four sub-
indices: board, compensation, audit, and takeover. Model 1 only includes size as a control variable 
and Model 2 includes only Size and Return on assets as the control variables for parsimony. 
Whereas, Models 3 and 4 include full set of control variables and year fixed-effect and Model 4 
also includes firm fixed-effects along with a full set of control variables. Further, Model 5 includes 
interaction variables Governance Indices  GFC for global financial crisis. Lastly, in Model 6 we 
include the size interaction variables Governance Indices  Size. The adjusted R2s of all the 
models are almost 50 percent except Model 1 where the adjusted R2s is 34.6 percent. The F-
statistics for all the six alternative regressions are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Table 7 depicts how the overall board index has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient in Models 1–3, suggesting that the presence of a more shareholder-friendly and strong 
board increases insolvency risk of financial institutions. This is consistent with the previous 
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literature finding that strong boards in financial institutions are associated with greater levels of 
risk (Pathan, 2009). Model 5 shows that the compensation sub-index has a strong negative 
coefficient suggesting better alignment of interests increases insolvency risk during the period of 
financial crisis. Lastly, Model 6 shows that larger financial institutions have more insolvency risk.  
 
(insert Table 8 about here) 
 
Table 8 reports the regression estimates of Equation (1) with credit default swap spread 
(CDS) as the dependent variable. Regressions in this table are similar to those in Table 7 with 
estimates of six alternative versions of Equations (1). Here, also, Governancej,t represents four 
sub-indices. The adjusted R2s of all the models vary from 29 percent to almost 52 percent. The F-
statistics for all the six alternative regressions are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
The regression estimates reported in this table are comparable to Table 7 where the board index 
is positive and statistically significant in Models 1–3 showing that a more shareholder-friendly 
and strong boards increase insolvency risk of financial institutions. Model 5 shows that the 
compensation sub-index has strong positive coefficient, suggesting better alignment of interests 
increases insolvency risk during the period of financial crisis. Lastly, Model 6 shows that 
shareholder-friendly board in a larger financial institution is associated with greater insolvency 
risk. 
In summary, from the regression results reported in Tables 4, 5, 7, and 8, we find that 
insolvency risk of a financial institution is positively associated with the shareholder-friendliness 
of that financial institution’s corporate governance especially for large financial institutions and 
during the period of the global financial crisis. Prior literature (e.g., Mehran et al., 2011; Beltratti 
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and Stulz, 2012; de Haan and Vlahu, 2015) highlights that strong, shareholder-friendly 
governance practices may encourage excessive risk-taking in the financial industry in order to 
increase shareholders’ wealth. We provide empirical support for this argument. 
 
4.4. Addressing endogeneity 
 
We recognize that the coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 may to some extent be biased 
because corporate governance structure is largely endogenous (Adams et al., 2010). Two 
important concerns should be addressed, as these can affect the interpretation of our results. First, 
it could be that we do not actually capture the relationship between insolvency risk and CGQ 
because of omitted variables. To mitigate this issue, we use firm fixed-effects and try to include 
different control variables and show that our results hold. Second, it could be that there is reverse 
causality, that insolvency risk affects CGQ and not the other way around. For instance, the risk 
preferences of financial institutions can also affect the strength of corporate governance 
mechanisms. To address this issue, we use lagged CGQ and propensity score matching.  
 
4.4.1 Lagged variables 
Although we include both firm fixed-effects and year fixed effects to alleviate the 
endogeneity concerns, in order to further investigate the predictive ability of corporate governance 
mechanisms for insolvency risk and also eliminate the concerns regarding reverse causality, we 
follow Jo and Harjoto (2012) and estimate causal effect of lagged CGQ on insolvency risk 
measured by distance to default and CDS spread. We also investigate the inverted causal effect 
of lagged distance to default and CDS spread on CGQ. The regression results (not tabulated) 
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indicate that results are similar to our previous results in Tables 4 and 5 for both first and second 
lags of corporate governance measures. Furthermore, we also find that the direction of causation 
is from corporate governance to insolvency risk and not the other way around. These results 
provide support to our main findings that strong corporate governance mechanisms lead to higher 
levels of insolvency risk in financial institutions. 
4.4.2. Propensity score matching 
To further eliminate the endogeneity bias, we conducted propensity score matching where 
we match firm-years with CGQ index greater than median (treatment group) with firm-years with 
CGQ index lower than median (control group). Table 9 reports the propensity score matching 
estimation results and compares the insolvency risk (measured by distance to default and credit 
default swap (CDS) spread) of financial institutions in the treatment and control groups. First, we 
estimated the probability that a financial institution has stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e. has CGQ index greater than the median). This probability is the propensity score 
and is the predicted value from a logit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable which equals one if CGQ index is greater than the median and zero otherwise. The logit 
regression results are reported in the pre-match column of Panel A of Table 9 and the same control 
variables are included as in Table 4 and Table 5. The regression results suggest that financial 
institutions with stronger corporate governance mechanisms have a lower loans to total assets 
ratio and lower performance as measured by return on assets ratio.  
We then ensure that financial institutions with stronger corporate governance mechanisms 
(the treatment group) are (sufficiently) similar to the matched financial institutions with CGQ 
lower than median (the control group) by adopting the nearest neighbor criteria. For this purpose, 
each financial institution with a CGQ greater than the median is matched to a financial institution 
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with a CGQ lower than the median by the closest propensity score. We employ matching with 
replacement and allow for control firms to be matched to multiple treatment firms. We further 
require that the difference between the propensity score of treatment and matched firms does not 
exceed 0.5% in absolute value.  
In order to ensure that financial institutions in both groups (treatment and control) are 
almost similar in terms of observable characteristics, we perform two diagnostic tests. In the first 
test, we re-estimate the logit regression model for the post-match sample. The results of this 
regression are reported in the post-match column of Panel A of Table 9. All the regression 
coefficients are statistically insignificant and smaller than those in the column pre-match, 
suggesting that both groups are almost similar in terms of observable characteristics. Panel B of 
Table 9 reports the results of the second diagnostic test in which we examine the difference for 
each control variable between the treated financial institutions and the matched control financial 
institutions. Again, we find no significant difference in observable characteristics between the two 
groups. Thus, these results suggest that propensity score matching alleviates the problem of 
endogeneity and removes other observable differences and increases the probability that any 
difference in the insolvency risk between the treated and control groups is because of the strength 
of corporate governance mechanisms.  
Lastly, the propensity score matching estimates and the multivariate results using the 
matched sample are reported in Panel C and Panel D of Table 9, respectively. As is evident in 
Panel C of Table 9, we find significant differences in both insolvency risk measures between the 
treatment and control group. In detail, we find that distance to default is lower and CDS spread is 
higher in the financial institutions with stronger corporate governance mechanisms than the 
otherwise indistinguishable financial institutions with relatively weaker corporate governance 
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mechanisms). Likewise, the multivariate results reported in Panel D of Table 9 show that financial 
institutions with stronger corporate governance have a greater insolvency risk. The results from 
this analysis suggest that endogeneity bias is not likely to drive our main inference, that is, stronger 
corporate governance mechanisms lead to greater insolvency risk in the financial industry. 
 
4.5. Additional analysis 
 
In order to check the robustness of our empirical findings, we perform several additional 
tests. First, we restrict our sample only to deposit-taking financial institutions, that is, financial 
institutions with a deposit to asset ratio of at least 10%. We then re-estimate all the regression 
models in Tables 4 and 5. The regression results (not tabulated) are similar to our previous results 
showing that strong corporate governance mechanisms and more shareholder-friendly boards are 
associated with a higher level of insolvency risk. This suggests that non-depository financial 
instruction does not drive our main findings.  
Second, in order to examine whether our empirical findings are affected by the diversity 
of financial institutions, we restrict our sample to the lending financial institutions and commercial 
banks, that is, financial institutions with a loans to asset ratio of at least 30%. We re-estimated all 
the regression models in Tables 4 and 5 with this restricted sample. The regression results (not 
tabulated) are similar to our previous findings in Tables 4 and 5, thus providing support to our 
main findings that financial institutions with strong corporate governance mechanisms are 
associated with a higher level of insolvency risk.  
Third, we also examine the potential effect of the size of the financial institution on our 
results. For this purpose, we divided our sample into two subsamples where we either exclude the 
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smallest 10 percent or the largest 10 percent financial institutions from the main sample. The re-
estimated regression results (not tabulated) for the subsample without the smallest 10 percent of 
financial institutions are quite similar to our main results reported in the Tables 4 and 5, that is, 
stronger and shareholder-friendly governance provisions are detrimental for the survival of the 
financial institutions. However, the coefficient estimates for governance (not tabulated) for the 
subsample where we exclude the largest 10 percent of financial institutions mostly become 
insignificant although positively related to insolvency risk. These findings provide some evidence 
that, to some extent, larger financial institutions might be driving our results.  
Fourth, we excluded the observations from the year 2008 (the year of the global financial 
crisis) to preclude the concern of extreme observations. We then re-estimated most of the 
regression models in Tables 4 and 5 based on this sample. We observe, based on empirical results 
(not tabulated), that our findings that stronger corporate governance mechanisms are associated 
with a higher level of insolvency risk in financial institutions do not change even when we exclude 
the extreme observations from 2008. 
Finally, we excluded troubled financial institutions from our sample, that is, those with a 
return on assets ratio of less than 2%. We did so to examine the effect of the financial crisis on 
our findings. We re-estimated the regression based on this sample. The additional analysis (not 
tabulated) reveals that the exclusion of these extreme observations does not have much impact on 
our main findings. Overall, the additional analysis provides strong evidence to infer that in 
financial institutions stronger and more shareholder-friendly governance mechanisms can lead to 







Given the high-profile failures of financial institutions (e.g., Lehman Brothers) during the 
global financial crisis, investors and regulators are looking skeptically at global financial markets. 
The financial crisis is arguably related to the unethical behavior of corporate executives and 
failures of corporate governance to curtail excessive risk-taking in financial institutions. Our 
study, therefore, is important to provide insight on the implications of the corporate governance 
in financial institutions which are encouraged to take on too much risk owing to the presence of 
financial safety net. In particular, our study contributes to the ongoing debate on the risk taking 
implications of shareholder-friendly corporate governance and provides what is to the best of our 
knowledge the first comprehensive and robust evidence on the relationship between corporate 
governance and insolvency risk of financial institutions around the global financial crisis. 
Based on the sample of 556 US financial institutions over the period from 2005 to 2010 and 
using two measures of insolvency risk, namely market-based distance to default and innovative 
credit default swap spread, our results suggest that more shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance is related to increased insolvency risk of the financial institutions. This empirical 
relationship is robust against the inclusion of firm specific characteristics, year and firm fixed 
effects, alternative sample specifications (e.g., excluding troubled financial institutions) and 
alleviating endogeneity concerns using lagged variable and propensity score matching 
approaches. Overall, our findings on the positive association between corporate governance and 
insolvency risk are consistent with the earlier research showing that the presence of a financial 
safety net for financial institutions if they become distressed, together with shareholder-friendly 
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corporate governance, encourages corporate executives to take on extra risk which might 
ultimately lead to insolvency.  
Since the global financial crisis is particularly associated with excessive risk taking, we 
further explored the interaction effect of shareholder-friendly corporate governance and the global 
financial crisis on the insolvency risk. As expected, we find that the positive association between 
corporate governance and insolvency risk is stronger during the period of the financial crisis. This 
finding corroborates the existing literature showing that the global financial crisis was, at least to 
some extent, caused by the excessive risk taking by financial institutions. We also explored the 
“too-big-to-fail” phenomenon that encourages financial institutions to take excessive risk. 
Specifically, our empirical results reveal that the positive linkage between corporate governance 
and insolvency risk is stronger for larger financial institutions.  
Our findings offer important implications for corporate executives, regulators, investors, and 
researchers. The results could assist managers of financial institutions to control risk-taking 
behavior by reforming corporate governance mechanisms. Financial regulators could benefit from 
this study that it could provide a basis from which to enhance economic growth, reduce 
bankruptcy levels, and add value to the wealth of stockholders by focusing on corporate 
governance areas. Regulators should pay close attention because strong corporate governance 
mechanisms in the financial industry together with policies like “too-big-to-fail” and financial 
safety nets can encourage excessive risk taking, which can cause instability in the overall financial 
system. Overall, our results require corporate governance reforms to address financial safety net 
and “too-big-to-fail” issues and reduce moral hazard leading to excess risk taking by financial 
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institutions. Without such reforms, stronger corporate governance mechanisms in the financial 
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Table A. Variable Definitions and Sources. 
 
Variable name  Definition  Data source  
Insolvency Risk Variables  
Distance to default  
Annual average of distance to default based 
on stock based on stock price variability  
Obtained from Risk 
Management Institute at 
NUS 
Credit Default 
Swap Spread  
credit derivatives that allow the transfer of 
the firm’s default risk between two agents 
for a predetermined time period 
Obtained from Risk 
Management Institute at 
NUS 
   
Governance variables  
Corporate 
governance  
Overall corporate governance index  ISS  
Board  





Corporate governance index based on 
compensation and ownership characteristics  
ISS  
Auditing  
Corporate governance index based on 
auditing characteristics  
ISS  
Takeover  
Corporate governance index based on 
takeover characteristics  
ISS  
   
Bank control variables  
Size Logarithm of total assets  BankScope  
Return on assets Ratio of net income to total assets BankScope  
Growth 
Percentage change in the amount of 
outstanding loans 
BankScope  
Loans to total 
assets  
Ratio of net loans to total assets BankScope  
Non-interest 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Mean St.dev Min Max P25 P75 Observations 
Dependent variables:        
DD 1.89 1.79 -2.04 20.71 0.67 2.89 2126 
CDS 3.89 1.54 -2.40 7.89 2.96 4.88 2126 
        
Corporate governance variables:        
CGQ 51.42 26.63 0.50 100.00 29.90 73.70 2342 
BoardQ 2.94 1.32 0.00 5.00 2.00 4.00 2342 
Compensation 3.45 1.34 0.00 5.00 2.00 5.00 2342 
Audit 3.14 1.54 0.00 5.00 2.00 5.00 2342 
Takeover 2.95 1.26 0.00 5.00 2.00 4.00 2342 
         
Control variables:        
Size 14.48 1.72 9.45 21.54 13.43 15.10 2342 
Return on assets 0.41 2.54 -18.42 44.31 0.13 1.05 2338 
Loans to assets 67.14 15.24 0.00 93.54 61.04 76.64 2292 
Loan growth 7.30 24.79 -84.15 704.49 -2.67 12.92 2132 
Deposits to assets 0.77 0.15 0.00 0.98 0.74 0.86 2322 
Non-interest income 23.97 38.57 -938.37 271.50 13.90 31.52 2331 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. DD is the Distance to Default measures the difference between the asset value of the financial 
institution and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the financial institution’s asset value. CDS is the credit default swap spread is the 
pricing of the financial distress risk (Das et al., 2009). CDS are credit derivatives that allow the transfer of the firm’s default risk between two agents for a 
predetermined time period. CGQ (Corporate Governance Quotient) measures the strength of the firm’s corporate governance mechanisms and BoardQ (Board 
Quotient) measures the strength of the board of directors. Compensation index is based on compensation and ownership characteristics of financial institution. 
Auditing index is based on auditing characteristics. Takeover index is based on takeover characteristics. The control variables are defined as follows: Size is 
measured as the logarithm of total assets, Global Financial Crisis is the dummy variable for global financial crisis, Return on assets is the ratio of net income 
to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t–1 to year t, Deposits to assets 




Table 2. Correlations. 
 
The table reports the pairwise correlations for the variables used in the empirical analysis. DD is the Distance to Default measures the difference between the asset 
value of the financial institution and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the financial institution’s asset value. CDS is the credit default 
swap spread is the pricing of the financial distress risk (Das et al., 2009). CDS are credit derivatives that allow the transfer of the firm’s default risk between two 
agents for a predetermined time period. CGQ (Corporate Governance Quotient) measures the strength of the firm’s corporate governance mechanisms and BoardQ 
(Board Quotient) measures the strength of the board of directors. Compensation index is based on compensation and ownership characteristics of financial 
institution. Auditing index is based on auditing characteristics. Takeover index is based on takeover characteristics. The control variables are defined as follows: 
Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Global Financial Crisis is the dummy variable for global financial crisis, Return on assets is the ratio of net income 
to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t–1 to year t, Deposits to assets is 
the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) DD 1.00             
(2) CDS -0.96 1.00            
(3) CGQ -0.07 0.07 1.00           
(4) BoardQ -0.05 0.06 0.83 1.00          
(5) Compensation -0.01 0.02 0.42 0.27 1.00         
(6) Audit -0.01 0.02 0.34 0.25 0.06 1.00        
(7) Takeover 0.10 -0.09 0.10 0.04 -0.10 0.01 1.00       
(8) Size 0.14 -0.11 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.13 0.15 1.00      
(9) Return on Assets 0.58 -0.63 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.07 1.00     
(10) Loans to assets -0.13 0.14 -0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.34 -0.12 1.00    
(11) Loan growth 0.15 -0.16 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.26 -0.05 1.00   
(12) Deposits to assets -0.07 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.12 -0.07 -0.27 -0.19 0.35 -0.16 1.00  
(13) Non-interest income 0.11 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.13 -0.24 0.04 -0.18 1.00 
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Table 3. Univariate tests. 
  Strong Governance Weak Governance   
Variable Mean Mean 
Diff. in 
Means   
Dependent variables:             
CDS 3.7536   3.3743   0.3782866 *** 
DD 2.0651   2.5243  -0.459197 *** 
Explanatory variables:             
CGQ 86.4921   14.4276   72.06444 *** 
BoardQ 4.3848   1.4919   2.892917 *** 
Compensation 4.1202   2.5189   1.60126  *** 
Audit 3.7986   2.4191   1.37949 *** 
Takeover 3.2746   2.9416   0.3330693 *** 
Control variables:             
Total assets 14.6783   14.6489   0.0296883   
Return on assets 0.1565   0.5261   -0.3695937  *** 
Loans to assets 66.5127   67.4004   -0.8876757   
Loan growth 5.0647   7.9700    -2.905315 *** 
Deposits to assets 0.7743   0.7718   0.0025219    
Non-interest income 23.3517    22.9185   0.4332103   
This table reports the results of two-tailed t-tests under the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the means between financial institutions with stronger and 
weaker corporate governance mechanisms. The subsample with stronger governance contains financial institutions with CGQ in the top 30% and the subsample of 
weaker governance contains financial institutions with CGQ in the bottom 30% of the sample. CDS is the credit default swap spread is the pricing of the financial 
distress risk (Das et al., 2009). CDS are credit derivatives that allow the transfer of the firm’s default risk between two agents for a predetermined time period. DD 
is the Distance to Default measures the difference between the asset value of the financial institution and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation 
of the financial institution’s asset value. CGQ (Corporate Governance Quotient) measures the strength of the firm’s corporate governance mechanisms and BoardQ 
(Board Quotient) measures the strength of the board of directors. The control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, 
Global Financial Crisis is the dummy variable for global financial crisis, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of 
net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t–1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-
interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Corporate governance and distance to default (DD).  
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) 
Corporate Governance variables:                                       
CGQ -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 * -0.001   0.0138                       
  (-4.09)   (-3.21)   (-1.65)   (-0.92)   (1.63)                       
CGQ × GFC             -0.003 *                         
              (-1.73)                           
CGQ × Size                 -0.001 **                     
                  (-2.01)                       
BoardQ                     -0.090 *** -0.060 *** -0.019   -0.022   0.469 *** 
                      (-4.30)   (-3.01)   (-0.60)   (-0.76)   (2.74)   
BoardQ × GFC                                 -0.070 *     
                                  (-1.74)       
BoardQ × Size                                     -0.036 *** 
                                      (-3.11)   
Control variables:                                         
Size 0.149 *** 0.126 *** -0.469 ** 0.127 *** 0.187 *** 0.147 *** 0.125 *** -0.462 ** 0.128 *** 0.231 *** 
  (9.35)   (7.51)   (-2.52)   (7.56)   (5.43)   (9.27)   (7.44)   (-2.48)   (7.57)   (6.08)   
Return on assets 0.284 *** 0.442 *** 0.266 *** 0.440 *** 0.442 *** 0.283 *** 0.441 *** 0.268 *** 0.439 *** 0.441 *** 
  (25.87)   (23.69)   (12.52)   (23.57)   (23.71)   (25.84)   (23.55)   (12.56)   (23.46)   (23.63)   
Loans to assets     -0.008 *** 0.0215 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 ***     -0.008 *** 0.022 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** 
      (-3.85)   (3.98)   (-3.78)   (-4.03)       (-3.82)   (4.06)   (-3.78)   (-4.13)   
Loan growth     -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002       -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   
      (-1.40)   (-1.65)   (-1.39)   (-1.43)       (-1.36)   (-1.63)   (-1.33)   (-1.39)   
Deposits to assets     1.103 *** 0.460   1.095 *** 1.053 ***     1.097 *** 0.418   1.085 *** 1.040 *** 
      (4.81)   (0.76)   (4.78)   (4.57)       (4.78)   (0.69)   (4.73)   (4.53)   
Non-interest income     0.0001   0.001   0.000   0.000       0.0001   0.001   0.000   0.000   






Table 4. Continued. 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) 
Constant Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effects No   No   Yes   No   No   No   No   Yes   No   No   
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adjusted R2 50.3%   53.2%   50.6%   53.2%   53.3%   50.3%   53.2%   50.5%   53.2%   53.4%   
Observations 2122   1924   1924   1924   1924   2122   1924   1924   1924   1924   
 
The table reports the estimates of ten alternative versions of the following panel regression specification: 
 
 𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡





+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
 
 
where the dependent variable DDi,t is the Distance to Default measures the difference between the asset value of the financial institution and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard 
deviation of the financial institution’s asset value. Governancei,t is either CGQ (Corporate Governance Quotient) which measures the strength of the firm’s corporate governance mechanisms or 
BoardQ (Board Quotient) which measures the strength of the board of directors. The control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Global Financial 
Crisis is the dummy variable for global financial crisis, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the 
percentage change in loans from year t–1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income. k
iFirm is a 
dummy variable for firm i and y
iYear  is a dummy variable for fiscal years. The reported adjusted R
2s are the overall R2s which account for the explanatory power of the firm and year fixed-effects. 
The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors, which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Corporate governance and credit default swap spread (CDS). 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) 
Corporate Governance variables:                                       
CGQ 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 * 0.001   -0.013 *                     
  (3.78)   (3.02)   (1.69)   (0.83)   (-1.70)                       
CGQ × GFC             0.003 *                         
              (1.68)                           
CGQ × Size                 0.001 **                     
                  (2.06)                       
BoardQ                     0.077 *** 0.051 *** 0.019   0.014   -0.427 *** 
                      (4.05)   (2.79)   (0.65)   (0.51)   (-2.71)   
BoardQ × GFC                                 0.069 *     
                                  (1.89)       
BoardQ × Size                                     0.033 *** 
                                      (3.05)   
Control variables:                                         
Size -0.103 *** -0.073 *** 0.734 *** -0.0737 *** -0.130 *** -0.102 *** -0.072 *** 0.728 *** -0.075 *** -0.168 *** 
  (-7.14)   (-4.74)   (4.30)   (-4.77)   (-4.11)   (-7.06)   (-4.67)   (4.26)   (-4.81)   (-4.80)   
Return on assets -0.250 *** -0.483 *** -0.351 *** -0.481 *** -0.483 *** -0.250 *** -0.482 *** -0.353 *** -0.481 *** -0.482 *** 
  (-25.09)   (-27.87)   (-17.77)   (-27.74)   (-27.89)   (-25.07)   (-27.74)   (-17.79)   (-27.66)   (-27.82)   
Loans to assets     0.009 *** -0.011 ** 0.008 *** 0.009 ***     0.008 *** -0.011 ** 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 
      (4.57)   (-2.11)   (4.51)   (4.75)       (4.54)   (-2.20)   (4.49)   (4.84)   
Loan growth     0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001       0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   
      (0.87)   (0.77)   (0.87)   (0.90)       (0.84)   (0.76)   (0.81)   (0.87)   
Deposits to assets     -1.172 *** -0.245   -1.165 *** -1.126 ***     -1.167 *** -0.206   -1.155 *** -1.117 *** 
      (-5.55)   (-0.43)   (-5.52)   (-5.31)       (-5.53)   (-0.36)   (-5.47)   (-5.29)   
Non-interest income     -0.001   -0.001   -0.001   -0.001       -0.001   -0.001   -0.001   -0.001   






Table 5. Continued. 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) 
Constant Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effects No   No   Yes   No   No   No   No   Yes   No   No   
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adjusted R2 45.2%   51.6%   45.9%   51.6%   51.6%   45.2%   51.5%   45.8%   51.6%   51.7%   
Observations 2122   1924   1924   1924   1924   2122   1924   1924   1924   1924   
 
The table reports the estimates of six alternative versions of the following panel regression specification: 
 
 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡





+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
 
 
where the dependent variable CDSi,t is the credit default swap spread is the pricing of the financial distress risk (Das et al., 2009). CDS are credit derivatives that allow the transfer of the firm’s 
default risk between two agents for a predetermined time period. Governancei,t is either CGQ (Corporate Governance Quotient) which measures the strength of the firm’s corporate governance 
mechanisms or BoardQ (Board Quotient) which measures the strength of the board of directors. The control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Global 
Financial Crisis is the dummy variable for global financial crisis, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is 
the percentage change in loans from year t–1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income. k
iFirm
is a dummy variable for firm i and y
iYear  is a dummy variable for fiscal years. The reported adjusted R
2s are the overall R2s which account for the explanatory power of the firm and year fixed-
effects. The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors, which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
43 
 
Table 6. Economic significance analysis. 
 
Insolvency risk proxies 
Change in CG index  
from 25th to 75th 
percentile (1) 






Economic significance (%) 
(3/4*100) 
Model 2: year effect      
DD 43.8 -0.0031 -0.1375 1.89 -7.28 
CDS 43.8 0.0027 0.1187 3.89 3.05 
      
Model 3: Year + firm 
effect      
DD 43.8 -0.0027 -0.1169 1.89 -6.19 
CDS 43.8 0.0025 0.1108 3.89 2.85 
      
Model 4: Crisis      
DD 43.8 -0.0034 -0.1476 1.89 -7.81 
CDS 43.8 0.0030 0.1318 3.89 3.39 
      
Model 5: Size      
DD 43.8 -0.0012 -0.0504 1.89 -2.67 





Table 7. Corporate governance sub-indices and distance to default (DD). 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Corporate Governance variables:                       
Board -0.128 *** -0.089 *** -0.064 *** -0.012   -0.044   0.388 ** 
  (-5.00)   (-3.99)   (-2.98)   (-0.37)   (-1.42)   (2.09)   
compensation -0.038   -0.006   0.001   -0.028   0.087 *** -0.198   
  (-1.56)   (-0.28)   (0.04)   (-1.00)   (2.92)   (-1.12)   
Audit -0.010   -0.001   0.007   -0.002   -0.016   0.293 * 
  (-0.46)   (-0.06)   (0.40)   (-0.07)   (-0.61)   (1.76)   
Takeover 0.057 ** 0.031   0.033   -0.031   0.060 ** 0.255   
  (2.26)   (1.42)   (1.54)   (-0.86)   (2.06)   (1.37)   
Board × GFC                 -0.034       
                  (-0.80)       
Compensation × GFC                 -0.163 ***     
                  (-3.99)       
Audit × GFC               0.035       
                 (0.98)       
Takeover × GFC                 -0.061       
                  (-1.47)       
Board × Size                     -0.031 ** 
                      (-2.44)   
Compensation × Size                     0.014   
                      (1.16)   
Audit × Size                     -0.020 * 
                      (-1.73)   
Takeover × Size                     -0.015   





Table 7. Continued. 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Control variables:                         
Size 0.137 *** 0.144 *** 0.121 *** -0.450 ** 0.126 *** 0.288 *** 
  (7.33)   (8.86)   (7.10)   (-2.39)   (7.36)   (4.15)   
Return on assets     0.282 *** 0.440 *** 0.268 *** 0.439 *** 0.440 *** 
      (25.69)   (23.49)   (12.54)   (23.50)   (23.53)   
Loans to assets         -0.008 *** 0.022 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** 
          (-3.75)   (4.05)   (-3.91)   (-4.05)   
Loan growth         -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   
          (-1.41)   (-1.60)   (-1.40)   (-1.40)   
Deposits to assets         1.106 *** 0.431   1.127 *** 1.066 *** 
          (4.80)   (0.71)   (4.90)   (4.61)   
Non-interest income         0.000   0.001   0.000   0.000   
          (0.44)   (0.74)   (0.45)   (0.43)   
                          
Constant Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effects No   No   No   Yes   No   No   
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adjusted R2 34.6%   50.3%   53.1%   50.5%   53.6%   53.4%   
Observations 2126   2122   1924   1924   1924   1924   
 
The table reports the estimates of ten alternative versions of the following panel regression specification: 
 
 𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡





+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
 
 
where the dependent variable DDi,t is the Distance to Default measures the difference between the asset value of the financial institution and the face value of its 
debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the financial institution’s asset value. Governancei,t represents one of the four sub-indices e.g. Board, Compensation, Audit 
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and Takeover. The control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Global Financial Crisis is the dummy variable for 
global financial crisis, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage 
change in loans from year t–1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total 
income. k
iFirm is a dummy variable for firm i and 
y
iYear  is a dummy variable for fiscal years. The reported adjusted R
2s are the overall R2s which account for the 
explanatory power of the firm and year fixed-effects. The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors, which are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 8. Corporate governance sub-indices and credit default swap spread (CDS). 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Corporate Governance variables:                       
Board 0.108 *** 0.077 *** 0.057 *** 0.015   0.035   -0.375 ** 
  (4.73)   (3.81)   (2.91)   (0.49)   (1.22)   (-2.20)   
compensation 0.028   -0.000   -0.0061   0.013   -0.087 *** 0.138   
  (1.26)   (-0.01)   (-0.32)   (0.52)   (-3.20)   (0.85)   
Audit 0.011   0.003   -0.013   -0.002   0.018   -0.172   
  (0.55)   (0.17)   (-0.77)   (-0.11)   (0.73)   (-1.12)   
Takeover -0.054 ** -0.031   -0.019   0.054   -0.041   -0.250   
  (-2.35)   (-1.53)   (-1.00)   (1.61)   (-1.55)   (-1.46)   
Board × GFC                 0.040       
                  (1.03)       
Compensation × GFC                 0.152 ***     
                  (4.07)       
Audit × GFC               -0.047       
                 (-1.45)       
Takeover × GFC                 0.049       
                  (1.29)       
Board × Size                     0.030 ** 
                      (2.54)   
Compensation × Size                     -0.010   
                      (-0.92)   
Audit × Size                     0.011   
                      (1.06)   
Takeover × Size                     0.016   





Table 8. Continued. 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Control variables:                         
Size -0.092 *** -0.099 *** -0.069 *** 0.702 ** -0.0729 *** -0.215 *** 
  (-5.46)   (-6.71)   (-4.39)   (4.08)   (-4.65)   (-3.36)   
Return on assets     -0.249 *** -0.482 *** -0.354 *** -0.481 *** -0.482 *** 
      (-24.92)   (-27.70)   (-17.81)   (-27.73)   (-27.75)   
Loans to assets         0.008 *** -0.012 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 
          (4.50)   (-2.26)   (4.67)   (4.81)   
Loan growth         0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   
          (0.85)   (0.70)   (0.84)   (0.84)   
Deposits to assets         -1.182 *** -0.201   -1.198 *** -1.139 *** 
          (-5.57)   (-0.35)   (-5.66)   (-5.35)   
Non-interest income         -0.001   -0.001   -0.001   -0.001   
          (-0.93)   (-1.19)   (-0.92)   (-0.90)   
                          
Constant Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effects No   No   No   Yes   No   No   
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adjusted R2 29.1%   45.2%   51.5%   45.8%   52.0%   51.7%   
Observations 2126   2122   1924   1924   1924   1924   
 
The table reports the estimates of six alternative versions of the following panel regression specification: 
 
 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡





+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
 
 
where the dependent variable CDSi,t is the credit default swap spread is the pricing of the financial distress risk (Das et al., 2009). CDS are credit derivatives that 
allow the transfer of the firm’s default risk between two agents for a predetermined time period. Governancei,t represents one of the four sub-indices e.g Board, 
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Compensation, Audit and Takeover. The control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Global Financial Crisis is the 
dummy variable for global financial crisis, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan 
growth is the percentage change in loans from year t–1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of 
non-interest income to total income. k
iFirm is a dummy variable for firm i and 
y
iYear  is a dummy variable for fiscal years. The reported adjusted R
2s are the 
overall R2s which account for the explanatory power of the firm and year fixed-effects. The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors, 
which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 9. Propensity score matching estimator. 
Panel A: Pre-match propensity score regression and post-match diagnostic regression 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
Equals 1 if CGQ is greater than median and 0 
otherwise 
 Pre-match Post-match 
Size 0.007 0.001 
 (0.23) (0.03) 
Return on assets -0.062** 0.027 
 (-1.99) (0.52) 
Loans to assets -0.009*** -0.001 
 (-2.75) (-0.13) 
Loan growth -0.002 -0.004 
 (-1.25) (-1.11) 
Deposits to assets 0.290 0.008 
 (0.76) (0.01) 
Non-interest income 0.001 0.001 
 (0.94) (0.30) 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Constant 0.560 0.070 
 (0.91) (0.06) 
Observations 2131 2082 
Pseudo R2 0.0069 0.0023 
 
Panel B: Differences in firm characteristics       
Variable Treated group Control group Difference t-stat 
Size 14.455 14.433 0.022 0.30 
Return on assets 0.240 0.240 0.000 0.01 
Loans to assets 67.204 67.546 -0.342 -0.53 
Loan growth 6.351 7.525 -1.174 -1.50 
Deposits to assets 0.782 0.784 -0.002 -0.24 
Non-interest income 23.885 23.113 0.772 0.59 
 
Panel C: Propensity score matching estimator 
Variable Firm year obs. with high CGQ Firm year obs. With low CGQ Difference T-stat 
DTD 1.769 1.942 -0.173* -1.65 





Table 9. Propensity score matching estimator (continued). 
Panel D: Regression analysis based on treatment and control group 
  DD - regression CDS - regression 
Index dummy -0.135*** 0.062** 
 (-2.72) (2.45) 
Size 0.149*** -0.027*** 
 (9.17) (-3.24) 
Return on assets 0.442*** -0.323*** 
 (24.61) (-34.78) 
Loans to assets -0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (-2.75) (3.15) 
Loan growth -0.004*** 0.001* 
 (-2.81) (1.65) 
Deposits to assets 0.857*** -0.594*** 
 (3.67) (-5.00) 
Non-interest income 0.001 -0.001*** 
 (1.22) (-2.94) 
   
Year effect Yes Yes 
Constant 0.143 4.751*** 
 (0.41) (26.65) 
Observations 2082 2070 
Adjusted R-squared 0.541 0.505 





Appendix A: General procedure to calculate distance to default (DD) 
The Merton (1974) model views the firm’s equity value as a European call option on the firm’s 
assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s liabilities. This is because of the 
shareholders’ limited liability and their residual claim on the firm’s assets. If the firm’s value 
exceeds the level of liabilities (strike price) at the time of maturity, when the value of the equity is 
positive, shareholders exercise their option and the firm survives. If the firm’s value falls below 
the level of liabilities (strike price) at the time of maturity, when the value of equity becomes zero, 
the model assumes shareholders do not exercise their option and the firm defaults. Thus, the larger 
the positive distance between firm value and firm liabilities, the lower is the probability of financial 
distress. 
Value of firm (𝑉𝐴) = value of equity (𝑉𝑒) + Value of debt (X) 
Value of equity (𝑉𝑒) = Value of firm (𝑉𝐴) – Value of debt (X) 
Value of firm (𝑉𝐴) > Value of debt (X)  Value of equity (𝑉𝑒) is positive (firm survives) 
Value of firm (𝑉𝐴) < Value of debt (X)  Value of equity (𝑉𝑒) is zero (firm defaults)   
The Merton (1974) model has two important assumptions for the calculation of DD. First, it 
assumes that the value of the firm follows the geometric Brownian motion that is expressed as 
follows: 
𝑑 𝑉𝐴 =  𝜇 𝑉𝐴𝑑𝑡 +  𝜎𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑑𝑊         (A.1) 
where 𝑉𝐴 denotes the value of firm’s assets, 𝜇 represents expected continuously compounded 
returns on the firm’s assets, 𝜎𝐴 indicates instantaneous volatility of the firm’s assets, and 𝑑𝑊 is a 
standard Wiener process. 
Second, the model assumes that the firm has only two securities outstanding; namely, common 
stock and a zero coupon bond maturing at time (T).  
Based on these two assumptions, the equity of the firm can be viewed as a call option on the 
value of the firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to face value of the debt maturing at time T. 
Therefore, the market value of equity as a function of the total value of the firm’s assets can be 
expressed by using Black and Scholes’ (1973) formula for call options: 
𝑉𝑒 = 𝑉𝐴𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑋 𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁 (𝑑2)       (A.2) 
where 𝑉𝑒 is the market value of the firm’s equity, X is the face value of the debt, r is the risk-free 
rate, T is the time horizon for the maturity of debt, N symbolizes the function of the cumulative 
standard normal distribution, and 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 are given by the following formulas: 








2) 𝑇        
𝜎𝐴 √𝑇
,      𝑑2 =  𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐴 √𝑇               (A.3) 
In Eq. (A.2), 𝑉𝑒, X, r, and T are readily observable and known factors, whereas 𝑉𝐴 and 𝜎𝐴 are 
difficult to observe and are unknown factors. This means there are two unknowns in one equation, 
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so a unique solution to Eq. (A.2) is not available. Thus, another equation involving one of the two 
unknown factors is required.  
As in the Merton (1974) model, it is assumed that the value of the firm’s equity is a function 
of the value of its assets and time, so the second equation that relates the volatility of the firm’s 







𝜎𝐴                (A.4) 
According to the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the term 
𝜕𝑉𝑒
𝜕𝑉𝐴
 in Eq. (4) is equal to 𝑁(𝑑1), and 
can be rewritten as follows: 
 𝜎𝑒 = (
𝑉𝐴
𝑉𝑒
)  𝑁(𝑑1)𝜎𝐴               (A.5) 
Now, Eq. (A.2) and (A.5) can be solved simultaneously for the values of 𝑉𝐴 and 𝜎𝐴, and DD 
can be calculated by using the following equation: 








2) 𝑇        
𝜎𝐴 √𝑇
                (A.6) 
The probability of default (PD) is calculated as follows: 
𝑃𝐷 = 𝑁(−𝐷𝐷)                   (A.7) 
In a nutshell, for the calculation of DD, the following steps are required:  
1) Estimating the volatility of the firm’s equity (𝜎𝑒) through historical stock price data or option-
implied volatility data. Historical stock price data to estimate the volatility of the firm’s equity 
is easily available. Following the Hull (2009)  methodology, equity volatility can be calculated 
as: 
𝑅𝑖 = Ln (𝑝𝑟𝑡 − 𝑝𝑟𝑡−1)         (A.8) 
where 𝑅𝑖  is the daily stock returns, Ln is the natural logarithm, 𝑝𝑟𝑡is the stock price at the end 
of the day and 𝑝𝑟𝑡−1 is the stock price at the end of the previous day: 𝑖 =1, 2, 3…n.  


















      (A.9) 
where n denotes the number of observations in one year i.e., number of trading days. 
2) Selecting the forecasting horizon (T). Generally, the forecast horizon is one year (T=1).   
3) Measuring the face value of the debt (X). Generally, current liabilities plus half of the non-
current liabilities are used to proxy the face value of debt, as also advised by Moody’s KMV.  
4) Collecting the risk-free rate (r). 3-month bank accepted bill or T-bills can be used to proxy 
risk-free rate.  
5) Measuring the market value of equity (𝑉𝑒). It is calculated as the number of outstanding shares 
multiplied by market price per share. 
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Solving Eq. (A.2) and (A.5) simultaneously for the values of (𝑉𝐴) and(𝜎𝑒), and then calculate the 
DD using Eq. (A.6) and PD using Eq. (A.7). 
 
